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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: EVIDENCE OBTAINED
DURING AN ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WITHOUT
A WARRANT HELD INADMISSIBLE IN SUBSEQUENT
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
B VIRTUE of a 1961 Supreme Court decision,' the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure2 was ex-
tended to state as well as federal intrusions into the home. Prior
to that time, however, the Supreme Court had distinguished be-
tween administrative investigations and criminal searches by hold-
ing that the fourth amendment did not require a search warrant
for the former.3 This limitation upon the amendment was narrow-
ly construed in People v. Laverne,4 where the New York Court of
Appeals held that evidence obtained during an administrative search
without a warrant cannot be constitutionally admissible in a sub-
sequent criminal proceeding.
In Laverne, a local building inspector entered the defendant's
home, without his consent, pursuant to a local zoning ordinance5
authorizing investigations without a warrant. Once inside the home,
the inspector discovered that the defendant was engaged in business
activity proscribed both by the zoning ordinance and an earlier in-
junction.6 The inspector's testimony was subsequently introduced
I Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Bender, The Retroactive Effect
of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319.
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 See, e.g., Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price 364 U.S. 263 (1960), affirming by an equally
divided Court 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan dissented
in both opinions.
' 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
5 "It shall be the duty of the Building Inspector, and he hereby is given authority,
to enforce provisions of this ordinance. The Building Inspector in the discharge of
his duties shall have authority to enter any building or premises at any reasonable
hour." Brief for Appellants, p. 4, citing LAUREL HoLLow, N.Y., GEN. ORDINANCES art.
X, § 10.1 (1960).
Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 283 App. Div.
795, 128 N.Y.S.2d 326, aff'd, 307 N.Y. 784, 121 N.E.2d 618 (1954).
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in a successful criminal prosecution 7 for violation of the zoning
ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,8 holding
that when a search is conducted contrary to the wishes of a home
owner, the fact that it may have been initially permissible for ad-
ministrative purposes does not preclude the necessity of a warrant
in order to introduce evidence obtained thereby in a criminal pro-
ceeding.9
Originally, the fourth amendment was framed in response to the
pre-revolutionary English practice of issuing general warrants to un-
cover instances of seditious libel, as well as to the colonial writs of
assistance used to enforce customs regulations.10 When the fourth
amendment was drafted to prevent such oppressive invasions of the
home, its advocates drew no distinction between civil and criminal
searches."' However, fourth amendment standards were originally
developed only for criminal searches because early search and seizure
issues brought before the courts were exclusively in criminal con-
texts.12 Although several courts had decided that the states' power
7 The inspector entered the home on three different occasions, resulting in three
separate criminal prosecutions which were consolidated for the purpose of a single trial.
8 The court divided four to three, with one of the majority, Chief Judge Desmond,
filing a separate concurring opinion.
11By means of the fourteenth amendment, see text accompanying notes 1-2 supra,
defendant Laverne derived a fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In many instances searches without warrants for evidence of
crime are unreasonable. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10 See Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CALIF. L. REv. 474, 476 (1961). For an exhaustive treatment of the historical develop-
ment of the fourth amendment, see Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, JoHNs HoPINS UNIVERMITY
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Series 55, No. 2 .(1937). See also Barrett,
Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46;
Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT.
REv. 212; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HAv. L. Rev. 361 (1934);
Wood, The Scope of Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and Seizures, 34 W.
VA. L.Q. 1 (1927).
11 See Lasson, supra note 10, at 93; Comment, 44 MINN. L. Rev. 513, 523 (1960).12 See 17 U. Cm. L. Rev. 733, 736-37 (1950). The lack of precedent on administra-
tive search and seizure issues may result from the early absence of federal
administrative agencies. See GELLHoRN & BYSE, ADMINMSTRATIVE LAw 11 (4th ed. 1960).
Another factor is the immunity from suit of federal officers as agents of the Gov-
ernment with the privilege of sovereign immunity. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950); 1964 DUKE L.J. 603, 605. Furthermore, as the fourth amendment restricts only
governmental action, there are no prohibitions on searches and seizures exercised by
individuals. E.g., Burdeau v, McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (interrelationship between
fourth and fifth amendments indicates fourth amendment applies only to criminal
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to protect the health of its citizens was sufficient cause to permit
inspection without a warrant,13 the fourth amendment was not
deemed sufficient to exclude evidence obtained in violation thereof
in state court prosecutions.14
Therefore, it was not until 1949 that an administrative investi-
gation was challenged under fourth amendment standards." At that
time the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in ruling
that a health inspection without a warrant was unconstitutional,
held that administrative as well as criminal procedures are subjected
to fourth amendment restrictions. The court reasoned that the right
of privacy in the home was not limited to those guilty or suspected
of crime.'"
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland17 first
considered the application of the fourth amendment to state ad-
ministrative searches. There the defendant had refused to permit a
local health official to enter his home for purposes of investigating
an obvious health hazard. 8 In a five to four decision, the Court
established a dichotomy between administrative and criminal
searches,' 9 holding that a warrant is required for a police search 20
contexts). Contra, 8 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 nA (rev. ed. 1961) (privilege against
self-incrimination not generically related to fourth amendment).
18E.g., Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956) (routine inspection made
at reasonable hours); Dedrick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 At. 595, appeal dismissed, 299
U.S. 506 (1936) (veterinarian may enter barn without warrant to test cattle for
disease).
", Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1948), overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 645-60 (1961).
2r District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
11 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The court
argued that a distinction between dvil and criminal inspections would fail to recog-
nize that the fourth amendment did not confer a right. Rather, it was a right
already belonging to the people, and the amendment was intended to establish the
only exception to that right, that is allowing a search with presentment of a warrant.
Id. at 17. See 10 HAINGS L.J. 430, 432 (1959).
The Supreme Court did not consider the merits of this interpretation but disposed
of the case on other grounds. The Court found that there was no interference with
an officer in pursuance of his duties, and therefore there had been no violation of
the ordinance making interference a misdemeanor. Thus, the constitutional issues
were avoided. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 4 (1950).
1359 U.S. 360 (1959).
28 The defendant home owner denied entry to a health inspector who was acting
under the authority of a local health ordinance allowing the search without a warrant.
The search was prompted by the sight of rat infestation outside the house. Id. at 361.
:'Id. at 364, 366-67. The Court did not specify whether administrative investiga-
tions are subject to different standards under the fourth amendment than are criminal
searches, or whether the fourth amendment is to apply solely to criminal cases.
[Vol. 1965: 158
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but not for a reasonable administrative investigation.21 After recog-
nizing the value of administrative inspections to enforce minimal
housing standards and inhibit the spread of disease, the majority
determined that the effectiveness of such inspections would be
severely limited by requiring a warrant for each individual search.22
The Court also relied upon early case law to conclude that the
fourth amendment was intended to restrict only police searches for
crime.23 The problem which the majority in Frank did not consider,
however, was whether evidence obtained pursuant to an administra-
tive entry and investigation could be used to impose subsequent
criminal sanctions without the warrant required for most criminal
searches.
It may be validly assumed in at least two situations that a search
prompted by administrative considerations will retain its civil char-
acteristics. First, the object may be simply to gather information for
general ministerial purposes, such as a building inspector's study
directed toward future rezoning. Second, the search may lead to
administrative sanctions, such as reporting building violations to a
special zoning board which may issue an order enjoining violative
use of the property.24 Although judicial injunctions may be re-
quired to enforce the order,25 even in these instances subsequent
legal action retains the civil characteristics of the original search.
Nevertheless, a search which commences as civil in nature may
have certain criminal consequences, as violations of zoning ordi-
Compare Comment, supra note 11. at 523-24, with 8 WGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 12,
§ 2264 n.4.
2oIf the police search is incident to a valid arrest, a search warrant is not needed.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (dictum).
-'The inspection here was reasonable because it was made in furtherance of a
health program; there were valid grounds for suspicion of a present nuisance; it was
made during the daytime; and the inspector did not attempt to physically force
himself into the house. 359 U.S. at 366-67.
2Id. at 371; see Stahl & Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U.
Prrr. L. Rv. 256, 275-76 (1950); 28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 529, 534 (1959); 108 U. PA. L.
RaV. 265, 276-77 (1959). But see Note, 69 HAv. L. Rav. 1115, 1125 (1956); 44 IL. L.
Rav. 845, 847-48 (1950.)
2 359 U.S. at 365. But see text accompanying note 12 supra.
21 See 359 U.S. at 366. See also 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 51 (2d ed.
1953).
"Such injunctions are similar in nature to the injunctive relief necessary to abate
a public nuisance. 1 YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 24, § 112; see, e.g., Village of North-
port v. Walsh, 265 N.Y. 458, 193 N.E. 270 (1934); City of New York v. M. Wineburgh
Advertising Co., 122 App. Div. 748, 107 N.Y. Supp. 478 (1907); Town of Ramapo v.
Bockar, 151 Misc. 613, 273 N.Y. Supp. 452 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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nances are frequently misdemeanors punishable by fine or imprison-
ment.26 Furthermore, the investigator may discover evidence of a
crime unrelated to the original purposes of his search. Whereas
the Frank Court established the criminal-administrative dichotomy
only with reference to the inspector's attempt to gain entry, the
Court of Appeals in Laverne was confronted with evaluating the
search with reference to its subsequent judicial consequences.
Laverne indicates that there are two possible alternatives within
the context of the Frank holding. One is based upon the Supreme
Court's assertion that an initially unreasonable search is not ren-
dered constitutional by what it brings to bear.27 From this rule of
law, the dissent in Laverne inferred a corollary that a search which
is legal in its incipiency cannot be rendered unconstitutional by its
fruits.28 Thus, a search initiated with a bona fide administrative
intent will be valid irrespective of its consequences. This corollary,
however, is anomalous in that the rule from which it is derived was
established to strengthen the efficacy of fourth amendment rights.
The effect of the corollary would frustrate the fundamental aim of
the fourth amendment which was intended, at the very least, to
require warrants for searches leading to criminal prosecutions. 29
In order to avoid such an undesirable result, the plurality0 in
Laverne extended the criminal-administrative dichotomy to apply to
subsequent judicial action. Although this precludes the imposition
of criminal sanctions where there was a search without a warrant,
it also predicates the validity of the search upon the result of the
investigation. From a policy point of view, this denies the home
owner any certainty as to the constitutionality of the search until
long after the privacy of his home has been invaded. If he can
resist an administrative investigation only to the extent of objecting
to the admissibility of evidence in a criminal prosecution, then the
26 E.g., People v. Gillman, 6 App. Div. 2d 899, 177 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1958); 1 YoKLEY,
op. cit. supra note 24, §§ 105, 108.
- United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28, 29 (1927); see Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1952).
28200 N.E.2d at 446, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60. Support for this corollary may be
found in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), where an espionage conviction
was based upon evidence obtained by FBI agents during an administrative investiga-
tion. There, however, the search was authorized by a warrant.
29 See 359 U.S. at 365. •
s0 The term plurality is used to indicate the analysis of three of the four judges
agreeing to reverse the conviction. Chief Judge Desmond in his concurring opinion
agreed with this result solely on the basis that no reasonable grounds were shown
for the necessity of a search without a warrant.
[Vol. 1965:158
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search will not infringe upon fourth amendment rights prior to a
trial. However, at least two members of the Supreme Court have rec-
ognized that there is inherent in the fourth amendment a constitu-
tional right of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion. 3'
Freedom from arbitrary intrusion is seemingly frustrated in Laverne
if the home owner cannot rely upon his right to resist intrusion until
after the search is an accomplished fact.
If the criminal-administrative dichotomy established in Frank
were abandoned, a standard for decision exists which could be ap-
plied to all search and seizure cases irrespective of their criminal
or administrative characterizations. The "inherent necessity," or
"exceptional circumstances," doctrine has been developed in numer-
ous criminal cases.32 This holds that lack of a warrant will not
render a search unreasonable if there is an urgent need for in-
vestigation, such as a possible loss of evidence or imminent damage
to the public interest, and time does not allow for obtaining a war-
rant. Under this doctrine, the status of the officer and the purpose
of his mission are irrelevant-no government official can invade one's
private home without a warrant except in cases of an immediate
crisis.33 It may be argued that the "inherent necessity" doctrine
should not be applied in the context of an administrative search
because it arose out of cases involving only criminal searches. This
is not a particularly compelling argument, for it has only been re-
cently that fourth amendment search and seizure issues were raised
against administrative investigations.34 Reconsideration of the
criminal-administrative dichotomy by the Supreme Court would not
" See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (privacy against arbitrary
government intrusion is basic to fourth amendment); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
at 365, 374-75; cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517, 549-50 (1961) (dissenting
opinions on the merits).
32E.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (mere inconvenience
in appearing before a magistrate not sufficient to justify lack of warrant); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (evidence would not grow stale from a delay
in acquiring a warrant).
"The "inherent necessity" test would have brought a different result in Ohio
ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) affirming by an equally divided Court 168
Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958). That case upheld an ordinance authorizing a
building inspector's entry into the home without a warrant for the purpose of making
necessary repairs and alterations required by housing standards. Frank was held con-
trolling by the Justices for affirmance, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246,
248 (1959), presumably because the attempted entry was a purely administrative
exercise; but there was neither a reasonable belief that a code violation existed nor
a showing of why a search warrant could not have been attained.
" See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
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be inappropriate because Frank was decided before the Court ap-
plied fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure standards
to intrusions of state and local officials. 35 Moreover, the policy fac-
tors advanced in justification of Frank36 could be satisfied by the
stricter requirements of the "inherent necessity" doctrine. That is,
when the time required to procure a warrant would defeat the
purposes of inspection, the public interest in enforcing health and
other laws would be of paramount importance. For mere routine
inspections, however, the necessity of a warrant would not unduly
restrict the effective enforcement of the law.
The Supreme Court precedent in Frank compelled both the
plurality and dissenting opinions in Laverne to adhere to the crimi-
nal-administrative dichotomy. Hopefully, the inequitable results ad-
vocated by both opinions will prompt the Supreme Court to
reappraise the problem3 7 and formulate a new standard for deci-
sion.38 An application of the "inherent necessity" theory would
avoid the tenuous distinction between administrative and criminal
searches, as well as provide the home owner with some degree of
security against arbitrary intrusions at the time of entry.
a'Mr. Justice Brennan has expressed an opinion that the Frank decision was
strongly influenced by a distinction between the guaranties of privacy in the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960)
(dissenting opinion), affirming by an equally divided Court 168 'Ohio St. 123, 151
N.E.2d 523 (1958). Since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) incorporated fourth
amendment guaranties in the fourteenth, the Supreme Court is no longer concerned
with such a distinction.
26 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
87A further argument against use of the dichotomy is that it could lead to a
practice analogous to the "silver platter" doctrine. This concept allowed federal
officers to send state policemen, who were not subject to fourth amendment prohibi-
tions at that time, to make the search. Evidence so obtained would then be used
in federal prosecutions. In the present context, police officers could send administra-
tive officials to gather criminal evidence in the course of their inspections. However,
the "silver platter" doctrine was rejected in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Traynor, supra note 1.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960), (criminal evidence obtained under
the authority of a valid administrative search admissible), attempts to eliminate any
possible analogy to the "silver platter" doctrine by emphasizing that the initial ad-
ministrative search must be a bona fide step to a civil proceeding. See also note 28
supra.8 The equal division of the Court in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263
(1960), affirming by an equally divided Court 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523
(1958), and Frank, see note 3 supra, indicates that the addition of Mr. Justice Goldberg
in place of Mr. Justice Frankfurter may result in overruling Frank.
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